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We study the cyclical implications of credit market imperfections in a calibrated dynamic, stochastic
general equilibrium model wherein firms face persistent shocks to aggregate and individual productivity.
In our model economy, optimal capital reallocation is distorted by two frictions: collateralized borrowing
and partial capital irreversibility yielding (S,s) firm-level investment policies.
In the presence of persistent heterogeneity in capital, debt and total factor productivity, the effects
of a financial shock are amplified and propagated through large and long-lived disruptions to the distribution
of capital that, in turn, imply large and persistent reductions in aggregate total factor productivity.
We find that an unanticipated tightening in borrowing conditions can, on its own, generate a large
recession far more persistent than the financial shock itself. This recession, and the subsequent recovery,
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Can a large shock to an economy’s ﬁnancial sector produce a large and lasting recession?
Can it amplify and propagate the eﬀects of a real shock suﬃciently to transform recession into
depression? Over the past few years, events in the real and ﬁnancial sectors of the U.S. and
other large, developed economies have been diﬃcult to disentangle. If these conditions have
reawakened interest in business cycle research, they have also raised concerns about our existing
macroeconomic models’ ability to address such topics.
In this paper, we develop a quantitative, dynamic, stochastic general equilibrium model to
explore how real and ﬁnancial shocks interact in determining the size and frequency of aggregate
ﬂuctuations. In our model, ﬁrms experience persistent shocks to both aggregate and individual
productivity, while credit market frictions interact with real frictions to yield persistent disruptions
to the eﬃcient allocation of capital across them, and thus persistent reductions in endogenous
aggregate productivity. Calibrating our model to aggregate and ﬁrm-level data, we use it as a
laboratory in which to obtain answers to the questions raised above.
Considering the matter from the perspective of a representative agent model, one might expect
that the reductions in aggregate capital implied by a temporary tightening in credit markets could
not yield sizeable or long-lived real aggregate eﬀects, since investment is a small fraction of GDP.
However, disaggregated data reveals that there is substantial heterogeneity across ﬁrms in their
individual productivity levels, and that there are real frictions limiting the reallocation of capital
across them.1 Indeed, these elements are essential to understanding microeconomic investment
patterns. In light of the ﬁrst fact, a reduction in credit may sharply reduce aggregate total factor
productivity by distorting the allocation of production away from the eﬃcient one, placing too
little capital in a subset of ﬁr m sw i t hr e l a t i v e l yh i g hp r o d u c t i v i t i e s . 2 To the extent that real
frictions slow the reversal of such an allocative disruption, the second fact compounds the ﬁrst,
propagating shocks to the provision of credit.
As mentioned above, capital reallocation is distorted by two frictions in our model, one ﬁnan-
1For direct evidence of large and increasing heterogeneity in ﬁrm-level productivity, see Comin and Philippon
(2005) and the empirical studies cited therein. Elsewhere, Cooper and Haltiwanger (2006) ﬁnd it is impossible to
reproduce microeconomic investment patterns without both large idiosyncratic shocks and adjustment costs limiting
capital reallocation.
2Restuccia and Rogerson (2008) show that this endogenous TFP eﬀect is an important component in explaining
cross-country per-capita GDP diﬀerences.
1cial and one real. First, collateralized borrowing constraints limit the investment undertaken by
small ﬁrms. Second, speciﬁcity in capital implies partial investment irreversibilities that lead ﬁrms
to pursue (S,s) rules with respect to their capital adjustments. The second friction further tilts
the distribution of production towards larger ﬁrms, further reducing endogenous aggregate total
factor productivity. This added element of realism in our setting relative to existing DSGE ﬁnan-
cial frictions models may be quite important to the transmission and propagation of a ﬁnancial
shock, as we discuss below.
The inclusion of the real friction hindering capital reallocation makes our model diﬃcult to
solve and analyze, in that it implies a distribution of ﬁrms distinguished by three individual
state variables: productivity, debt and capital . W h i l ei tw o u l db em o r ec o n v e n i e n tt oo m i tt h e
partial irreversibility of investment and track ﬁrms entirely by their productivity and net worth,
we see its presence as essential to the proper calibration of the model along the dimensions that
matter most. Capital reallocation is at the heart of what is new in our model’s mechanics. As
such, it is important that we ensure reasonable agreement there between our model economy and
microeconomic evidence from the actual economy it is intended to emulate.
The extent to which changes in the availability of credit disrupt real economic activity depends
upon the amount of capital reallocation that would otherwise occur. Alternatively, the response
to a credit shock hinges on the initial shape of the cross-sectional distribution of ﬁrms, as well as
its elasticity with respect to the shock. Both aspects of our model are crucially aﬀected by the
volatility and persistence of ﬁrm-level productivity shocks. As such, these parameters must be
chosen to ensure that the reallocation it predicts in a typical data is plausible relative to what we
see in the data. We measure our model’s ﬁt in this respect using observations on establishment
investment rates drawn from U.S. data. Certainly, the idiosyncratic productivity parameters can
be selected so that the model reproduces the mean and standard deviation of establishment-level
investment rates. However, unless we include some real friction inhibiting reallocation alongside
our calibrated ﬁnancial friction, no plausible idiosyncratic productivity process can overcome our
model’s counterfactual tendency for negative serial correlation in ﬁrms’ investment rates. Thus,
we introduce a partial irreversibility in investment and calibrate this jointly with the ﬁrm-level
productivity process to ensure the microeconomic predictions of our model regarding capital
reallocation are sensible before turning to its predictions regarding macro e c o n o m i ct i m es e r i e s .
When calibrated to the microeconomic evidence on capital reallocation, our model gives rise to
2a rich distribution. Within this distribution, a subset of ﬁrms have investment curtailed by their
current ability to borrow, while a second subset have suﬃcient resources as to have permanently
outgrown the implications of collateral constraints. Most ﬁrms fall into a third class, one where
borrowing constraints do not currently bind, but the prospect that they may bind in future
aﬀects current decisions. In the aggregate, revenues net of labor costs exceed total investment.
Thus, our model is consistent with evidence from the U.S. Flow of Funds that the average ﬁrm
can has suﬃcient funds to internally ﬁnance investment. Nonetheless, because individual ﬁrms
have diﬀering credit needs and access, a change in ﬁnancial conditions can aﬀect the level of real
economic activity.
Our primary question in this study is whether a temporary crisis in ﬁnancial markets can
generate a large and persistent drop in aggregate productivity by disrupting the distribution
of capital further from that implied by ﬁrms’ relative productivities, thereby further distorting
the distribution of production. We are to our knowledge the ﬁrst to explore this endogenous
TFP channel in a quantitative DSGE setting where real frictions slow the reallocation of capital
across ﬁrms, and where that reallocation is essential in determining the marginal product of
the aggregate stock. In keeping with previous results in the literature, we ﬁnd that aggregate
responses to real shocks are largely unaﬀected by the presence of ﬁnancial frictions. However,
changes in the distribution of capital can have large and long-lived eﬀects in our model economy.
Because there are substantial and protracted changes in this distribution when individual ﬁrms
encounter unexpectedly tight collateralized borrowing limits, and because these changes in turn
imply persistent reductions in aggregate productivity, we ﬁnd that an unanticipated disruption
to the availability of credit can, on its own, generate a large and protracted recession.
We also ﬁnd that the response to a credit shock is qualitatively diﬀerent from that following a
real shock, both at its impact and in the recovery episode. Unlike the response to a productivity
shock, the greatest declines in output, employment and investment do not occur at the onset
of a credit crisis, and consumption does not fall immediately. Moreover, once credit conditions
return to normal, our model predicts the subsequent recovery will be slow, and it will be led by
employment and business ﬁxed investment, rather than household consumption spending.
Given the widely-held view that crises in ﬁnancial markets had a large role in the most recent
U.S. recession, we are led to compare the changes in our model following a credit shock to those
observed in the data after 2007Q4. Ohanian (2009) has argued that, in comparison to other
3episodes over the postwar period, this recession is particularly diﬃcult to explain using a standard
equilibrium business cycle model driven by exogenous shocks to total factor productivity. When
driven by such shocks, our own model behaves similarly to that standard representative ﬁrm
model. As such, when we introduce TFP shocks suﬃcient to generate the observed decline in
GDP, we ﬁnd that the resulting declines in employment, investment, and lending are far weaker
than those in the data. Moreover, the changes in TFP required to generate the empirical decline
in total production are sharply overstated relative to the observed changes in measured TFP.
When we instead consider a temporary shock aﬀecting individual ﬁrms’ access to credit in our
model, we ﬁnd the aggregate changes it predicts resemble those from the 2007 U.S. recession in
several respects. It delivers a gradual deterioration of GDP, an initial rise in consumption, and
an unusually steep decline in investment. It also succeeds in capturing the magnitudes of decline
in GDP and investment, and it generates equilibrium reductions in total lending consistent with
several measures from the aggregate data. Further, our credit shock leads to shifts in the distri-
bution of production across ﬁrms that produce endogenous changes in total factor productivity
consistent with those measured from the aggregate data. Tighter borrowing limits worsen the
allocation of capital and increase the dispersion in the returns to investment. This is consistent
with the ﬁnding of Eisfeldt and Rampini (2006) that the beneﬁts to capital reallocation rise in
recessions.
We argue that our analytical framework captures real and ﬁnancial frictions that are vital in
explaining actual microeconomic reallocation and that thus have the potential to shape macro-
economic outcomes. As such, our ﬁndings here are suggestive that changes in ﬁrms’ access to
credit are important in understanding the recent US recession. With this said, we would not
suggest that our model explains the recent U.S. recession. Our recession is generated by an unan-
ticipated one-time tightening of collateral constraints that persists for several periods, while the
recovery that follows is initiated by the instantaneous return of lending conditions to normal.
This simple exercise cannot, in itself, explain the U.S. recovery that began in the second half of
2009. Most notably, while its GDP recovery is gradual, even more so than in the data, the model
cannot simultaneously account for the growth in consumption alongside much weaker growth in
employment and investment.
The solution method we use to derive competitive equilibrium in our model may be of inde-
pendent interest. As noted above, ﬁrms diﬀer in their total factor productivity, capital and debt,
4and the partial irreversibility of investment implies that ﬁrms’ net worth is insuﬃcient to describe
the endogenous component of their individual state. Beyond this, our collateral constraints and
our investment irreversibility together lead to nonlinear ﬁrm-level decision rules that preclude a
solution based on linear approximation.
To solve for dynamic stochastic general equilibrium, with ﬁrms’ decision rules evolving in
response to ﬁrm-speciﬁc shocks, their existing capital and debt, and the aggregate state of the
economy, we use nonlinear methods, alongside aggregate state space approximation. Beyond
these elements, our solution method relies on identifying a set of ﬁr m st h a th a v ea c c u m u l a t e d
suﬃcient real and/or ﬁnancial assets such that collateralized borrowing limits will never again
aﬀect their choice of capital. We characterize the behavior of these ﬁrms, including both their
physical investment in capital and their savings in ﬁnancial assets. This provides the starting
point to solve for the decision rules of all other ﬁrms in the economy.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 brieﬂy summarizes the literature
most closely related to our work. Next, in section 3, we present our model economy. Section 4
provides some analysis useful in developing a numerical algorithm capable of its solution. In
section 5, we describe our calibration to moments drawn from postwar U.S. aggregate and ﬁrm-
level data and also explain our numerical approach. Section 6 presents results. There, we begin by
exploring the mechanics of our model in its deterministic steady state. Next we consider business
cycles in our model driven by shocks to the exogenous component of total factor productivity,
contrasting the results to those obtained from a reference model without ﬁnancial frictions as well
as a frictionless benchmark with neither real nor ﬁnancial frictions. Thereafter, we explore the
eﬀects of a credit shock. Finally, section 7 concludes.
2 Related literature
Until recently, there has been little quantitative research examining the channels through
which changes in the availability of credit inﬂuence macroeconomic series like business investment,
employment and production in well-articulated dynamic stochastic general equilibrium settings.
There is a large related literature exploring how ﬁnancial frictions inﬂuence the aggregate response
to non-ﬁnancial shocks. Leading this literature, Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) develop a model
of credit cycles and show that collateral constraints can have a large role in amplifying and
5propagating shocks to the value of collateral.3 Our own work follows in the spirit of Kiyotaki
and Moore in that the ﬁnancial frictions we explore are collateralized borrowing constraints. We
adopt this approach in part because collateral appears to have an important role in loan contracts
and in part for computational tractability in our heterogeneous ﬁrm DSGE setting.
W h i l ew ea s s u m et h a tﬁrms face collateral constraints, there are well-known alternative ap-
proaches. Cooley, Marimon and Quadrini (2004) study constrained-optimal dynamic contracts
under limited enforceability.4 Elsewhere, a large literature examines agency costs as the source of
ﬁnancial frictions.5 However, these papers do not consider ﬁnancial shocks as such. Moreover,
they abstract from potentially important heterogeneity across ﬁrms under which the allocation of
capital, and thus credit, becomes relevant.
Over the past few years, several studies have begun exploring how ﬁnancial shocks aﬀect
aggregate ﬂuctuations. A leading example is Jermann and Quadrini (2010), which examines a
representative ﬁrm model wherein investment is ﬁnanced using both debt and equity, while costs
of adjusting dividends prevent the avoidance of ﬁnancial frictions. These frictions stem from
limited enforceability of intra-temporal debt contracts, which gives rise to endogenous borrowing
limits. Speciﬁcally, the ﬁrm retains its working capital under default, but the lender is able to
recover a fraction of the ﬁrm’s future value. Shocks to the fraction that the lender can conﬁscate
alter the severity of borrowing limits. Measuring these credit shocks, Jermann and Quadrini ﬁnd
that they have been an important source of business cycles.6 In contrast to the Jermann and
Quadrini model, the ﬁnancial frictions in our setting do not signiﬁcantly dampen the response
of the aggregate economy to non-ﬁnancial shocks. We also introduce a real friction in the form
of capital speciﬁcity.7 Because this hinders the reallocation of capital across ﬁrms, it leads to
3Cordoba and Ripoll (2004) and Kocherlakota (2000) argue that these eﬀects are quantitatively minor in cali-
brated versions of the model.
4Firm-level dynamics in our model have some similarities to those in models with contrained optimal dynamic
contracts. For example, because our borrowing and investment decisions are inter-related, young ﬁrms grow as their
ability to borrow rises and mean growth rates fall with age and size. Albuquerque and Hopenhayn (2004) derive
these regularities in a model with limited enforceability, while Clementi and Hopenhayn (2006) derive them under
private information. However, in contrast to these papers, our ﬁrm-level debt is not contingent.
5See Bernanke and Gertler (1989), Carlstrom and Fuerst (1997), and Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist (1999).
6Jermann and Quadrini (2009) adapt this model to address the evolving variability of real and ﬁnancial variables
in the past 25 years. In a related setting, Christiano, Motto and Rostagno (2009) study a New Keynesian model
with lending subject to agency costs; they too ﬁnd that ﬁnancial shocks are an important source of economic
ﬂuctuations.
7See Veracierto (2002) for a DSGE analysis of how these frictions aﬀect aggregate responses to productivity
6a more gradual evolution of our distribution of ﬁrms that, in itself, both dampens and protracts
the real eﬀects of credit shocks.
Our emphasis on ﬁrm-level productivity dispersion is shared by Arellano, Bai and Kehoe
(2010), who examine the role of uncertainty shocks in a model with non-contingent debt and
equilibrium default. Gomes and Schmid (2009) also develop a model with endogenous default,
where ﬁrms vary with respect to their leverage, and study the implication for credit spreads.8 In
contrast to these papers, we study ﬁrm-level capital reallocation and the aggregate response to
credit shocks. We ﬁnd that credit shocks can generate recessions through reductions in aggregate
TFP that, in turn, have sharp implications for investment and employment. In emphasizing the
endogenous TFP channel, our study is also related to Buera and Shin (2007). They examine the
eﬀect of collateral constraints on economic development and show that these frictions can protract
the transition to the balanced growth path if capital is initially misallocated.
3M o d e l
In our model economy, ﬁrms face both partial capital ﬁxity and collateralized borrowing lim-
its, which together compound the eﬀects of persistent diﬀerences in their total factor productivities
to yield substantial heterogeneity in production. We begin our description of the economy with
an initial look at the optimization problem facing each ﬁrm, then follow with a brief discussion
of households and equilibrium. Next, in section 4, we will use a simple implication of equilibrium
alongside some immediate observations about ﬁrms’ optimal allocation of proﬁts across dividends
and retained earnings to characterize the capital adjustment decisions of our ﬁrms. This analysis
will show how we derive a convenient, computationally tractable algorithm to solve for equilibrium
allocations in our model, despite its three-dimensional heterogeneity in production.
3.1 Production, credit and capital adjustment
We assume a large number of ﬁrms, each producing a homogenous output using predetermined
capital stock  and labor , via an increasing and concave production function,  =  ().
shocks. Caggese (2007) considers both irreversible capital and collateral constraints; our study is distinguished
from his by general equilibrium analysis, partial reversibility in investment, and frictionless within-period borrowing.
8Gilchrist, Sim and Zakrajšsek (2011) study credit spreads under uncertainty shocks in a model with default.
Credit spreads are also emphasized by Gertler and Kiyotaki (2010); they study a model where such spreads are
driven by agency problems arising with ﬁnancial intermediaries.
7The variable  represents exogenous stochastic total factor productivity common across ﬁrms,
while  is a ﬁrm-speciﬁc counterpart. For convenience, we assume that  is a Markov chain,  ∈
E ≡ {1 },w h e r ePr(0 =  |  = ) ≡  ≥ 0,a n d
P
=1  =1for each  =1  .
Similarly,  ∈ {1 },w h e r ePr(0 =  |  = ) ≡ 




 =1  .
Because our interest is in understanding how ﬁnancial constraints interact with the speciﬁcity
of capital in shaping the investment decisions taken by ﬁrms in our economy, we must prevent
ﬁrms growing so large that none will never again experience a binding borrowing limit. To ensure
this does not occur, we impose exit and entry in the model. In particular, we assume that each
ﬁrm faces a ﬁxed probability,  ∈ (01), that it will be forced to exit the economy following
production in any given period. Within a period, prior to investment, ﬁrms learn whether they
will survive to produce in the next period. Exiting ﬁrms are replaced by an equal number of new
ﬁrms whose initial state will be described below.
At the beginning of each period, a ﬁrm is deﬁned by its predetermined stock of capital,
 ∈ K⊂R+, by the level of one-period debt it incurred in the previous period,  ∈ B⊂R,a n db y
its current idiosyncratic productivity level,  ∈ {1 }. Immediately thereafter, the ﬁrm
learns whether it will survive to produce in the next period.9 Given this individual state, and
having observed the current aggregate state, the ﬁrm then takes a series of actions to maximize
the expected discounted value of dividends returned to its shareholders, the households in our
economy. First, it chooses its current level of employment, undertakes production, and pays
its wage bill. Thereafter, it repays its existing debt and, conditional on survival, it chooses its
investment, , current dividends, and the level of debt with which it will enter into the next period,
0. F o re a c hu n i to fd e b ti ti n c u r sf o rt h en e x tp e r i o d ,aﬁrm receives  units of output that it
can use toward paying current dividends or investing in its future capital. The relative price −1
reﬂecting the interest rate at which ﬁrms can borrow and lend is a function of the economy’s
aggregate state, as is the wage rate  paid to workers. For expositional convenience, we suppress
the arguments of these equilibrium price functions until we have described the model further.
In contrast to the typical setting with ﬁrm-level capital adjustment frictions, and unlike a
9We have adopted this timing to ensure there is no equilibrium default in our model, so that all ﬁrms borrow
at a common real interest rate. Because the only ﬁrms borrowing are those that will produce in the next period,
and the debt they take on is limited by a collateral constraint, ﬁrms are always able to repay their debt in the
quantatitative exercises to follow.
8typical environment with ﬁnancial frictions, real and ﬁnancial frictions are allowed to interact
in our model economy. Our ﬁrms’ borrowing and investment decisions are inter-related, because
each ﬁrm faces a collateralized borrowing constraint inside of any period. This constraint takes
the form: 0 ≤ . Two external forces together determine what fraction of its capital stock
a ﬁrm can borrow against - the degree of speciﬁcity in capital and enforceability of ﬁnancial
arrangements. Here, we simply impose both, deferring the question of their foundations for a
future study. In particular, we assume that  ∈ [01] is a parameter determining what fraction
of a ﬁrm’s capital stock survives when it is uninstalled and moved to another ﬁrm, and  ∈ R+
is the fraction of that collateral ﬁrms can borrow against.10 A ﬁnancial shock in our model is
represented by an unanticipated change in the collateral term, .
If a ﬁrm undertakes any nonnegative level of investment, then its capital stock at the start of
the next period is determined by a familiar accumulation equation,
0 =( 1− ) +  for  ≥ 0,
where  ∈ (01) is the rate of capital depreciation, and primes indicate one-period-ahead values.
Because there is some degree of speciﬁcity in capital, the same equation does not apply when the
ﬁrm undertakes negative investment. In this case, the eﬀective relative price of investment is 
rather than 1, so the accumulation equation is instead:
0 =  (1 − ) +  for 0.
In the analysis section to follow, we will show how the asymmetry that ﬁrms face in the cost
of capital adjustment naturally gives rise to two-sided () investment decision rules. Firms
have nonzero investment only when their capital falls outside a range of inactivity.11 In contrast
to a nonconvexity in the capital adjustment technology, this type of adjustment friction implies
not only investment inaction among ﬁrms within their () adjustment bands, but also some
inertia among ﬁrms outside of their () bands. Because there are no increasing returns in the
adjustment technology, and there is instead a linear penalty for negative adjustments, a ﬁrm
ﬁnding itself with an unacceptably high capital stock (given its current productivity) will reduce
10Throughout our numerical exercises in section 6, we assume that the degree of capital irreversibility, 1 − ,i s
a ﬁxed technological parameter. In ordinary times when aggregate ﬂuctuations arise from changes in productivity
alone,  is also a ﬁxed parameter. However, we allow for an unanticipated change in  when we consider the
aggregate implications of a credit shock in section 6.3.
11The problem of costly investment reversibility was originally solved by Abel and Eberly (1996).
9its stock only to the upper bound of its () inactivity range. Similarly, a ﬁrm with too little
capital recognizes that it will incur a linear penalty should it later need to shed capital, so it
invests only to the lower bound of its inactivity range.
It should be clear from the discussion above that, alongside its current productivity, a ﬁrm’s
capital adjustment may also be inﬂuenced by its ability to borrow (now and in the future). This
is in turn aﬀected by the capital (collateral) it currently holds. Note also that the ﬁrm’s current
investment decision may inﬂuence the level of debt it carries into the next period. These obser-
vations imply that we must monitor the distinguishing features of ﬁrms along three dimensions:
their capital, , their debt, , and their idiosyncratic productivity, . Thus, in contrast to models
with loan market frictions, but without irreversible investment, a ﬁrm’s net worth is an insuﬃcient
description of its state; capital and debt are distinct state variables.
We summarize the distribution of ﬁrms over () using the probability measure  deﬁned
on the Borel algebra, S, generated by the open subsets of the product space, S = K × B × E.
The aggregate state of the economy is then described by (), and the distribution of ﬁrms
evolves over time according to a mapping, Γ, from the current aggregate state; 0 = Γ().
The evolution of the ﬁrm distribution is determined in part by the actions of continuing ﬁrms
and in part by entry and exit. As already mentioned, fraction  of ﬁrms exit the economy
after production in each period. These ﬁrms invest negatively to shed their remaining capital,
returning the proceeds to households, and are replaced by the same number of new ﬁrms. Each
new ﬁrm has zero debt and productivity 0 ∈ E drawn from an initial distribution (0),a n d
each enters with an initial capital stock 0 ∈ K.12
We now turn to the problem solved by each ﬁrm in our economy. Let 0 (;) repre-
sent the expected discounted value of a ﬁrm that enters the period with () and ﬁrm-speciﬁc
productivity , when the aggregate state of the economy is (),j u s tb e f o r ei tl e a r n sw h e t h e r
it will survive into the next period. We state the ﬁrm’s dynamic optimization problem using a
functional equation deﬁned by (1) - (4) below.
0 (;)= max
 [ () − () +  (1 − ) − ] (1)
+( 1− )(;)
After the start of the period, the ﬁrm knows which line of (1) will prevail. If it is not continuing
12We select 0 below so that each entrant’s capital is  fraction of the typical stock held across all ﬁrms in the
long-run of our economy.
10beyond the period, the ﬁrm simply chooses labor to maximize its current dividend payment to
shareholders. Because it will carry no capital or debt into the future, an exiting ﬁrm’s dividends
are its output, less wage payments and debt repayment, together with the remaining capital it can
successfully uninstall at the end of the period. The problem conditional on continuation is more
involved, because a continuing ﬁrm must choose its current labor and dividends alongside its future
capital and debt. For expositional convenience, given the partial irreversibility in investment, we
begin to describe this problem by deﬁning the ﬁrm’s value as the result of a binary choice between
upward versus downward capital adjustment in (2), then proceed to identify the value associated
with each option in (3) and (4).
(;)=m a x
n
 (;)  (;)
o
(2)
Assume that  () is the discount factor applied by ﬁrms to their next-period expected
value if aggregate productivity at that time is  and the current aggregate state is ().
Taking as given the evolution of  and  according to the transition probabilities speciﬁed above,
and given the evolution of the ﬁrm distribution, 0 = Γ(),t h eﬁrm solves the following
two optimization problems to determine its values conditional on (weakly) positive and negative
capital adjustment. In each case, the ﬁrm selects its current employment and production, alongside
the debt and capital with which it will enter into next period and its current dividends, ,t o
maximize its expected discounted dividends. As above, dividends are determined by the ﬁrm’s
budget constraint as the residual of its current production and borrowing after its wage bill and
debt repayment have been covered, net of its investment expenditures.
Conditional on an upward capital adjustment, the ﬁrm solves the following problem con-
strained by (i) the fact that investment must be non-negative, (ii) a borrowing limit determined
by its collateral, and (iii)-(iv) the requirements that dividends be non-negative and satisfy the
ﬁrm’s budget constraint.












0 0 ; 0¢i
(3)
subject to: 0 ≥ (1 − ), 0 ≤ ,
0 ≤  ≤  () − () + ()0 −  − [0 − (1 − )],
and 0 = Γ()
The downward adjustment problem diﬀers from that above only in that investment must be
11non-positive and, thus, its relative price is .












0 0 ; 0¢i
(4)
subject to: 0 ≤ (1 − ), 0 ≤ ,
0 ≤  ≤  () − () + ()0 −  − [0 − (1 − )],
and 0 = Γ()
Notice that there is no friction associated with the ﬁrm’s employment choice, since the ﬁrm
pays its current wage bill after production takes place, and its capital choice for next period
also has no implications for current production. Thus, irrespective of their current debt or their
continuation into the next period, all ﬁrms sharing in common the same () combination select
the same employment, which we will denote by  (;), and hence have common production,
(;).13 The same cannot be said for the intertemporal decisions of continuing ﬁrms, given
the presence of both borrowing limits and irreversibilities. Let  (;) and  (;)
represent the choices of next-period capital and debt, respectively, made by ﬁrms sharing in
common a complete individual type (). We will characterize these decision rules below in
section 4.
3.2 Households
The economy is populated by a unit measure of identical households. Household wealth is
held as one-period shares in ﬁrms, which we identify using the measure .14 Given the prices
they receive for their current shares, 0 (;), and the real wage they receive for their labor
eﬀort, (), households determine their current consumption, ,h o u r sw o r k e d ,,a sw e l l
as the numbers of new shares, 0 (0 0 0),t op u r c h a s ea tp r i c e s1 (0 0 0;).T h e l i f e t i m e
13Here forward, except where necessary for clarity, we suppress the indices for current aggregate and ﬁrm pro-
ductivity,  and , respectively.
14Households also have access to a complete set of state-contingent claims. However, as there is no heterogeneity
across households, these assets are in zero net supply in equilibrium. Thus, for sake of brevity, we do not explicitly
model them here.
12expected utility maximization problem of the representative household is listed below.






























0 (;)([ × ])
and 0 = Γ()
Let  (;) describe the household decision rule for current consumption, and let  (;)
be the rule determining the allocation of current available time to working. Finally, let Λ (0 0 0;)
be the quantity of shares purchased in ﬁrms that will begin the next period with 0 units of capital,
0 units of debt, and idiosyncratic productivity 0.
3.3 Recursive equilibrium




=1  0 1 0Λ
´
,
that solve ﬁrm and household problems and clear the markets for assets, labor and output, as
described by the following conditions.
(i) 0 solves (1) - (4),  is the associated policy function for exiting ﬁrms, and ()
are the associated policy functions for continuing ﬁrms
(ii)   solves (5), and
¡
Λ¢
are the associated policy functions for households

























1 if  ≥ 0
 if 0
13(vi) 0 ()=( 1− )
R
{() | ((;)(;))∈}
([ ×  × ]) + (0)(),
for all () ∈ S,d e ﬁnes Γ,w h e r e(0)={1 if (00) ∈ ; 0 otherwise}
Let  and  describe the market-clearing values of household consumption and hours worked
satisfying conditions (iv) and (v) above, and denote next period’s equilibrium consumption and
hours worked when 0 =  as 0
 and 0
, respectively. It is straightforward to show that market-
clearing requires that (a) the real wage equal the household marginal rate of substitution between
leisure and consumption, ()=2 (1 − )1 (1 − ), that (b) the bond price,






)1 (1 − ),
and that (c) ﬁrms’ state-contingent discount factors agree with the household marginal rate of
substitution between consumption across states  ()=1 (0
1 − 0
)1 (1 − ).
We compute equilibrium by solving the ﬁrm-level optimization problem with these implications
of household utility maximization imposed, thereby eﬀectively subsuming households’ decisions
into the problems faced by ﬁrms.
Without loss of generality, we assign () as an output price at which ﬁrms value cur-
rent dividends and payments and correspondingly assume that ﬁrms discount their future values
by the household subjective discount factor. Given this alternative means of expressing ﬁrms’
discounting, the following three conditions ensure all markets clear in our economy.
()=1 (1 − ) (6)









Our reformulation of (1) - (4) below yields an equivalent description of the ﬁrm-level problem
where each ﬁrm’s value is measured in units of marginal utility, rather than output, with no change
in the resulting decision rules. Suppressing the arguments of the price functions, exploiting the
fact that the choice of  is independent of the 0 and 0 choices, and using the indicator function






 () − () (9)
+ (1 − ) − 
i
+( 1− ) (;),











0 0 ; 0¢i
(10)
subject to
0 ≤  ≤  () − () + ()0 −  − J
³
0 − (1 − )
´
[0 − (1 − )] (11)
and 0 ≤ .( 1 2 )
4A n a l y s i s
The problem listed in equations (9) - (12) forms the basis for solving equilibrium allocations in
our economy, so long as the prices  and  taken as given by our ﬁrms satisfy the restrictions in
(6) - (8) above.15 From here, we begin to characterize the decision rules arising from this problem.
Each ﬁrm chooses its labor  =  (;) to solve 2 ()=, which immediately returns
its current production, ()= ( (;)).L e t() represent the earnings of a
ﬁrm of type () net of labor costs and debt.
() ≡  ( (;)) −  (;) −  (13)
The challenging objects to determine are 0 and 0 for continuing ﬁr m s . T u r n i n gt ot h e s e ,
we will use a simple observation about the implications of borrowing constraints for the value a
ﬁrm places on retained earnings versus dividends. If the ﬁrm places non-zero probability weight
on encountering a future state in which its borrowing constraint will bind, the shadow value
of retained earnings (which includes the discounted sequence of multipliers on future borrowing
constraints) will necessarily exceed the shadow value of current dividends, .16 This means that
it will set  =0 . In this case, the binding budget constraint from equation 11 establishes that
the ﬁrm’s choice of 0 directly implies the level of debt with which it will enter into the next
period. We refer to any such ﬁrm as a constrained ﬁrm. To be clear, a constrained ﬁrm need not
currently face a binding borrowing constraint; our deﬁnition includes any ﬁrm that can now or
in future encounter a binding constraint. We will return to the problem solved by a constrained
ﬁrm below. It is useful to ﬁrst characterize the decisions of a ﬁrm whose capital choices are never
aﬀected by borrowing limits.
15Here, and in many instances below, we suppress the  arguments of price functions, decision rules and
ﬁrm-level state vectors to reduce notation.
16This is easily proved using a sequence approach with explicit multipliers on each constraint; see Caggese (2007).
154.1 Decisions among unconstrained ﬁrms
Consider a ﬁrm that has accumulated suﬃcient wealth (via 0 or 0) such that
collateral constraints will never again aﬀect its investment activities. In this case, the sequence of
multipliers on all possible future borrowing constraints are zero, and the ﬁrm is indiﬀerent between
allocating earnings to savings versus paying dividends. We refer to any such ﬁrm as unconstrained.
Importantly, as it is indiﬀerent between savings and paying dividends, an unconstrained ﬁrm’s
marginal value of retained earnings is equal to that of households.
Let 0 represent the beginning-of-period expected value of an unconstrained ﬁrm and  its
value if it will continue beyond the current period. These functions are analogous to those deﬁned
for any ﬁrm in (1).
0 (;)=
h
()+ (1 − )
i
+( 1− ) (;).( 1 4 )
As in (2), a continuing unconstrained ﬁrm has a binary choice involving capital adjustment. Let
 (;) represent its value it chooses to undertake an upward capital adjustment, and
 (;) its value conditional on a downward capital adjustment.
 (;)=m a x { (;) (;)} (15)
An unconstrained ﬁrm must never again experience a binding borrowing constraint (in any
conceivable future state). We assign any such indiﬀerent ﬁrm a savings policy just ensuring that,
under all possible future paths of (),i tw i l lh a v es u ﬃcient wealth to implement its optimal
investment plan while borrowing more that is permitted by (12). Below, we will deﬁne this
minimum savings policy. While an unconstrained ﬁrm’s minimum savings policy is aﬀected by its
capital choice, its capital choice is independent of its savings or debt, . Thus, before we derive
the savings policy for unconstrained ﬁrms, we characterize their capital adjustment.
By construction, an unconstrained ﬁrm has the same marginal valuation of savings as a house-
hold. It then follows from equation 13 that, if such a ﬁrm enters a period with any non-zero debt
or savings, ,i t sv a l u ei sa ﬀected only through the change in current earnings. As current earnings
are valued by , we can express the value of a continuing unconstrained ﬁrm of type () as
() − ,w h e r e() ≡  (0).T h eﬁrm’s beginning-of-period expected value inherits
t h es a m ep r o p e r t y ;0 (;)=0 () − ,w h e r e0 () ≡ 0 (0). Given these
16observations, we have:



























where (13) deﬁnes (),a n d0 = Γ().I n t h e a b o v e ,  and  are both strictly
increasing in . This in turn implies that  and 0 are increasing functions of the unconstrained
ﬁrm’s capital, as are the  and 0 functions deﬁned above.
We may characterize the capital decision rule for an unconstrained ﬁrm by reference to two
target capital stocks, the upward and downward adjustment targets that would solve the problems
in (16) and (17), respectively, were there no sign restrictions on investment. Deﬁne the upward
target, ∗
, as the capital a ﬁrm would choose given a unit relative price of investment, and deﬁne
the downward target, ∗
, as the capital a ﬁrm would choose given a relative price at .
∗





























Notice that each target is independent of current capital and depends only on the aggregate state
and the ﬁrm’s current . As such, all unconstrained ﬁrms that share in common the same current
productivity  have the same upward and downward target capitals. Note also that, because
  1 (and because the value function 0 is strictly increasing in ), the upward adjustment
target necessarily lies below the downward target: ∗
  ∗
.
We are now in a convenient position to retrieve the unconstrained ﬁrm’s capital decision rule.
Given a constant price associated with raising (lowering) its capital stock, and because 0 is
increasing in ,t h eﬁrm selects a future capital as close to the upward (downward) target as
its constraint set allows. Thus, the ﬁrm’s decision rules conditional on upward adjustment and
downward adjustment are as follow.
 ()=m a x{(1 − )∗
 ()} and  ()=m i n{(1 − )∗
 ()}
17Given these conditional adjustment rules, we know that an unconstrained ﬁrm of type ()
selects one of three future capital levels, 0 ∈ {∗
 ()∗
 ()(1 − )}. Which one it selects
depends only on where its current capital lies in relation to its two targets. Recalling that
∗
 ()  ∗
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Unconstrained ﬁrms maintain suﬃcient assets to prevent borrowing limits aﬀecting their fu-
ture investment. In this sense, they accumulate precautionary savings. Given the decision rule
for capital, we isolate a minimum level of ﬁnancial savings that insures that an unconstrained ﬁrm
of type () will never be aﬀected by borrowing constraints across all possible future (0;0 0).
Any such ﬁrm that maintains a level of debt not exceeding the threshold deﬁned by the minimum
savings policy will be indiﬀerent to paying additional revenues in the form of dividends, or accu-






deﬁne the maximum debt level at which a ﬁrm entering
next period with capital  (;) and ( ) will remain unconstrained. The following pair
of equations recursively deﬁnes the minimum savings policy, (;).







,( 2 1 )







 () − (1 − )
´h
 () − (1 − )
i
In equation 21, (;) is derived as the maximum level of debt with which the ﬁrm
can exit this period and be certain to remain unconstrained next period, given that it adopts the
unconstrained capital decision rule. Next, (22) deﬁnes the beginning of period maximum debt
level under which a ﬁrm can adopt the unconstrained capital rule and debt not exceeding that
17 In eﬀect, our minimum savings policy maximizes the dividends paid by unconstrained ﬁrms each period. We
adopt this policy rather than the natural alternative minimizing unconstrained ﬁrms’ period-by-period dividends
so as to bound the 0 levels carried by ﬁrms that can with positive probability outlive any set ﬁnite age we
consider.
18identiﬁed by the minimum savings policy without paying negative dividends, and hence satisfy
the deﬁnition of an unconstrained ﬁrm.
Notice that e  is increasing in the ﬁrm’s current earnings, since these may be used to cover
outstanding debt. The minimum operator imposes the borrowing constraint; if the ﬁrm does not
have suﬃcient collateral to borrow to , it can still be unconstrained if it has entered this period
with suﬃcient savings to ﬁnance its investment.
Given the decision rule for capital and the minimum savings policy, we can now retrieve
unconstrained ﬁrms’ dividend payments.
 ()=() − J
³
 () − (1 − )
´





The ﬁrm’s value, listed above in (15), may be expressed as









 (;)(;) ; 0¢
,
where 0 () is given by (14), and 0 = Γ().
4.2 Decisions among constrained ﬁrms
We now consider the decisions made by a ﬁrm that has, until now, been constrained. We
begin by evaluating whether or not the ﬁrm has crossed the relevant wealth threshold to become
unconstrained. If it has, the decision rules described above apply. If it has not, the collateralized
borrowing constraint will continue to inﬂuence its investment decisions, and its choice of capital
and debt will remain intertwined.
To ascertain whether a ﬁrm of type () has become unconstrained, we need only consider
whether it is feasible for the ﬁrm to adopt the capital rule  () a n dal e v e lo fd e b tn o t
exceeding that implied by the rule (), while maintaining non-negative dividends in the
current period. If the ﬁrm of type () is able to adopt the decision rules in (20) and (21)
without violating the non—negativity of dividends, then it achieves the value given by (24), and
it exits the period indistinguishable from any other unconstrained ﬁrm that entered the period
19with ().
 (;)= (;) iﬀ (;) ≥ 0 (25)
=   (;) otherwise
Any constrained ﬁrm that can adopt the decision rules of an unconstrained ﬁrm will always
choose to do so, since  ≤ . However, when the inequality in the top line of (25) is not satisﬁed,
the ﬁrm remains constrained, with value   (;).
We approach a continuing constrained ﬁrm’s problem as follows. First, given its (),w e
isolate a cutoﬀ debt level under which non-negative investment is a feasible option. The lowest
level of 0 associated with non-negative investment is (1 − ). If this choice is not aﬀordable
given the ﬁrm’s borrowing constraint in (12), it cannot undertake even a trivial upward capital
adjustment. Using (11), it follows that, among any group of ﬁrms sharing a common (),o n l y
those with  ≤  + ( ())− () can consider an upward capital adjustment.
Firms with higher levels of debt must choose a downward capital adjustment and repay debt by
selling capital.
We identify the maximum capital stocks permitted by the borrowing constraint under upward
and downward capital adjustment.










Next we determine the associated choice sets for upward and downward capital adjustment.
Λ()=[ ( 1 − ) ()]





Using these results and recalling 0 in equation (9), we may express a continuing constrained
ﬁrm’s value as follows.
  (;)=m a x {  (;) (;)},( 2 6 )


















−()+[ 0 − (1 − )]
´
and 0 = Γ()


















−()+[0 − (1 − )]
´
and 0 = Γ()
Denoting the capital stocks that solve the conditional adjustment problems in (27) and (28)
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The numerical algorithm we use to solve our model builds on that described in Khan
and Thomas (2003, 2008) using the analysis above. However, the discrete choices and three-
dimensional heterogeneity arising here from the presence of investment irreversibility and collat-
eralized borrowing, alongside the ﬁrm-level productivity shocks, necessitate a nonlinear solution
method that is more involved than that used in these papers.
We compute equilibrium by solving the problems of unconstrained and constrained ﬁrms in a
setting where prices are consistent with market-clearing. Because the distribution in the model’s
aggregate state is a high-dimensional object, we approximate it with the ﬁrst-moment of the
distribution of capital, applying the algorithm of Krusell and Smith (1998). More speciﬁcally, we
assume that agents perceive () as the economy’s aggregate state (rather than ()), where
 represents the unconditional mean of the distribution of capital across ﬁrms.
We replace Γ with a forecasting rule 0 = Γ
 (, ),  =1 ().T h es o l u t i o nm e t h o d
iterates over forecasting rules,  =1 2until they converge. In each iteration, given the 
set of forecasting rules, we solve the unconstrained and constrained ﬁrm value functions, thereby
obtaining their decision rules. In this ﬁrst step of the iteration, ﬁrms forecast the prices, , ,
and  as functions of  and . Next, we run a  period simulation, determining equilibrium
prices and aggregate quantities at each date of the simulation given the true aggregate state, the
21forecasting rule Γ
 (, ),a n dﬁrms’ decision rules. Thereafter, we use the simulation data to
update the forecasting rules using ordinary least squares regressions.
In the ﬁrst step of each iteration, where value functions are solved, ﬁrms assume that prices
are given by log-linear functions of  and ,  () and  ().18 Given these forecasting
rules for prices and the forecasting rule for the future state, Γ
, we solve for unconstrained ﬁrms’
value  using (14) - (17) and  (;)=()−. In doing so, we obtain the decision
rules , ,a n d from (20) - (23), which serve as inputs for solving the constrained ﬁrm
value function. Next, we solve for the constrained ﬁrm value function using (25) - (28) with (9),
with 0 serving as the initial guess for 0. I ne a c hc a s e ,w es o l v ef o rﬁrm values at a set of points
from the ﬁrm-level state vector; then we use non-linear multivariate piecewise polynomial spline
interpolation to approximate the ﬁrm value function consistent with these data. When solving






than the primitive  (;); this lets us restrict the points where values are solved to avoid
irrelevant areas of insolvency where ﬁrm debt is so high relative to productivity and capital that
it cannot be repaid.
In the second step of each iteration, we simulate the model for 5041 periods. The exact length
of our simulation is chosen to best ﬁt our parallel computing environment.19 We draw a ﬁxed
vector of aggregate shock levels, {}

=1,  = 5041, and assume an initial distribution of ﬁrms
that is equal to that obtained in the steady state of the model. This distribution over () is
stored using a ﬁne grid of values. As in the value function solution step, however, ﬁrms’ decisions
are not restricted to these grid points. Rather, when determining the future state, their choices
are allocated across the nearest pair of grid points using a weighting scheme that, in expectation,
yields the selected value.
At each date of the simulation, the distribution  implied by the previous date’s equilibrium
d e c i s i o n si su s e dt oc o m p u t e. Based on this, alongside , ﬁrms use , b  and Γ
 to forecast
their future values associated with any choice of 0 and 0. This lets them select their optimal
production, debt, and investment in response to any given set of prices ().W e s o l v e f o r t h e
18The utility function we assume below implies that the real wage is determined by , so a separate forecasting
rule for it is unnecessary.
19We solve the model using MPI with 71 computational cores in a Beowulf Cluster. Parallel methods are required,
despite our use of the Krusell Smith algorithm, because constrained ﬁrms’ decisions depend on their productivity,
debt and capital, implying a computationally intensive numerical algorithm.
22equilibrium (  ) so that the market-clearing conditions (iv) - (v) in section 3.3 are satisﬁed
and asset markets clear. This give us +1, the distribution of ﬁrms at the start of the next





new forecasting rules. The resulting rules for our baseline calibrated model, where  =1 35,
are listed in Table 5. Despite the rich distribution of ﬁrms in our economy, we ﬁnd that agents
are quite successful in forecasting the aggregate state with no more information on the current
distribution than the mean capital stock. The results presented in section 6.2 below will show
that this is because changes in  have little eﬀect on the shape of the distribution.
5 Calibration
The data on establishment-level investment dynamics are reported annually. As the mechan-
ics of the reallocation of capital across ﬁrms are at the core of our model, we reproduce salient
empirical regularities from this data. Accordingly, we set the length of a period to one year.
In the section to follow, we will consider how the mechanics of our model with real and ﬁnancial
frictions compare to those in two relevant reference models - one where there are no borrowing
limits and one where there are neither ﬁnancial nor real frictions ( =1 ). These two reference
models will help us to isolate how much the interaction between credit constraints and micro-level
capital rigidities inﬂuences our economy’s aggregate dynamics. Aside from the values of  and
, all three models share a common parameter set that is selected in our full model to best
match moments drawn from postwar U.S. aggregate and ﬁrm-level data. However, as the average
capital-to-output ratio and hours worked vary little across the three models, the results to follow
are unaﬀected by our decision to maintain a ﬁxed parameter set.
Across our model economies, we assume that the representative household’s period utility is
the result of indivisible labor (Rogerson (1988)): ()=l o g + .T h eﬁrm-level production
function is Cobb-Douglas: ()=. The initial capital stock of each entering ﬁrm is
a ﬁxed  fraction of the typical stock held across all ﬁrms in the long-run of our full economy;
that is, 0 = 
R
e ([ ×  × ]),w h e r ee  represents the steady-state distribution therein.
5.1 Aggregate data
We determine the values of , , , ,  and  using moments from the aggregate data
as follows. First, we set the household discount factor, , to imply an average real interest rate
23of 4 percent, consistent with recent ﬁndings by Gomme, Ravikumar and Rupert (2008). Next,
the production parameter  is set to yield an average labor share of income at 060 (Cooley and
Prescott (1995)). The depreciation rate, , is taken to imply an average investment-to-capital ratio
of roughly 0069, which corresponds to the average value for the private capital stock between 1954
and 2002 in the U.S. Fixed Asset Tables, controlling for growth. Given this value, we determine
capital’s share, , so that our model matches the average private capital-to-output ratio over the
same period, at 23, and we set the parameter governing the preference for leisure, ,t oi m p l ya n
average of one-third of available time is spent in market work.
We calibrate our model to reproduce an aggregate measure of the indebtedness of ﬁrms in
the U.S. economy. Speciﬁcally, we set the parameter determining our collateral constraint, ,
to imply an average debt-to-assets ratio at 0366, which matches that of nonfarm nonﬁnancial
businesses over 1952-05 in the Flow of Funds. The extent to which the resulting ﬁnancial frictions
aﬀect ﬁrm-level and aggregate outcomes depends on the productivity process individual ﬁrms
face, as well as the extent of investment irreversibility. We will determine these aspects of the
model using ﬁrm-level data below.
Exact aggregation obtains in the reference model without real or ﬁnancial frictions; in par-
ticular, it has an aggregate production function. We use this reference model to estimate an
exogenous stochastic process for aggregate productivity. We begin by assuming a continuous








N e x t ,w ee s t i m a t et h ev a l u e so f and  from Solow residuals measured using NIPA data on
US real GDP and private capital, together with the total employment hours series constructed by
Prescott, Ueberfeldt, and Cociuba (2005) from CPS household survey data, over the years 1959-
2002, and we discretize the resulting productivity process using a grid with 3 shock realizations
( =3 )t oo b t a i n() and (
). We apply this exogenous shock process across all three models;
as we will see below, there are no changes in the endogenous component of aggregate total factor
productivity in our full model with both real and ﬁnancial frictions when aggregate ﬂuctuations
are driven by exogenous shocks to aggregate TFP.
5.2 Firm-level data
The costly reversibility of investment and the dispersion of ﬁrm-level total factor productivity
are calibrated to reproduce microeconomic evidence on establishment-level investment dynamics.
24W eb e g i nb ya s s u m i n gt h a tﬁrm-speciﬁc productivity follows an AR(1) log-normal process, log0 =





.N e x tw ec h o o s e,  and  jointly to reproduce three aspects
of establishment-level investment data documented by Cooper and Haltiwanger (2006) based on a
17-year sample drawn from the Longitudinal Research Database. These targets are (i) the average
mean investment rate () across establishments: 0122, (ii) the average standard deviation of
investment rates: 0337, and (iii) the average serial correlation of investment rates: 0058.20
While our model has life-cycle aspects aﬀecting ﬁrms’ investments, the Cooper and Halti-
wanger (2006) dataset includes only large manufacturing establishments that remain in operation
throughout their sample period, Thus, in undertaking this part of our calibration, we must select
an appropriate model-generated sample for comparability with their sample. This we do by simu-
lating a large number of ﬁrms for 30 years, retaining only those ﬁrms that survive throughout, and
then restricting the dates over which investment rates are measured to eliminate life-cycle eﬀects.
This restricts attention to ﬁrms whose investment decisions are unaﬀected by their borrowing
limits. In implementing this algorithm, we discretize ﬁrms’ log-normal productivity process using





The idiosyncratic shock process we calibrate has a persistence of 0653 and a standard deviation
of innovations of 0135.A s ﬁrms in the model sample are unaﬀected by borrowing constraints,
their investments would respond immediately to changes in their total factor productivities in the
absence of costs of uninstalling capital. This implies a negative autocorrelation in investment
rates, since capital is determined by lagged investment. The costly reversibility of capital is
then essential in reproducing the investment moments reported above, and we set  =0 95 to
reproduce the serial correlation of investment rates in the data.
If we eliminate the real friction, ﬁrm-level capital reallocation dramatically increases. Main-
taining our idiosyncratic shock process but setting  =1 , the mean and standard deviation of
ﬁrm-level investment rates rises to 031 and 085, respectively, while the serial correlation falls to
−016. Alternatively, if we reset () to match the mean and standard deviation of 
 in the
data, the serial correlation falls to −02. When we impose a cost of uninstalling capital, ﬁrms
become unresponsive to moderate changes in . This reduces the variability of their investment,
and increases its persistence.
20While not a target in the calibration, our model also closely matches a fourth moment drawn from the Cooper
and Haltiwanger study, the fraction of establishment-year observations wherein a positive investment spike ( 
020) occurs: 0186.
25F i n a l l y ,w ec h o o s et h ee x i tr a t e ,, and the fraction of the steady-state aggregate capital stock
held by each entering ﬁrm, .W es e t at 010,s ot h a t10 percent of ﬁrms enter and exit the
economy each year. Next, we set  =0 10 s ot h a t ,i na na v e r a g ed a t e ,e a c he n t e r i n gﬁrm begins
with an initial capital that is one-tenth the size of the aggregate stock. If we had assumed constant
returns to scale in production, this would imply an employment size of entering ﬁrms averaging
one-tenth the size of the typical ﬁrm in our economy, matching the Davis and Haltiwanger (1992)
data. In our model economy, where returns to scale is 087, the relative employment size of a new
ﬁrm is 21 percent. In this sense, our choice of 0 is conservative.21
The table below lists the parameter set obtained from our calibration.
          
096 060 0065 027 215 0852 0014 135 010 010 095 0653 0135
Note that these parameters imply only a 5 percent loss incurred in uninstalling capital, and a
moderate degree of ﬁnancial frictions, with ﬁr m sa b l et ot a k eo nd e b tu pt o135 percent of the
value of their tangible assets. Also note that ﬁrm-level shocks are far more volatile and less
persistent than aggregate shocks. Given these aspects of the calibration, our model gives rise to a
stationary distribution of ﬁrms over () wherein roughly 86 percent of ﬁrms are constrained
when one applies the deﬁnition from section 4 above. By contrast, the fraction of ﬁrms facing a
currently binding borrowing limit is 27 percent.
6R e s u l t s
6.1 Steady state
We begin by considering the implications of borrowing limits and irreversibilities for the
typical decisions made in our economy. Figure 1 overviews the stationary distribution of ﬁrms
in the baseline case of our full model, presenting three slices of the full distribution. In the
top panel, we see the distribution of ﬁrms over capital and debt-to-capital levels at the lowest
ﬁrm-level productivity, while the middle and bottom present the counterparts at the median and
highest levels of productivity.
21To match the Davis and Haltiwanger relative employment size of an entrant in our setting, ﬁrms would have
to enter with only 33 percent the capital of the typical ﬁrm. In that case, ﬁrms would take far longer to mature,
amplifying the eﬀects of ﬁnancial frictions as well as the eﬀect of a credit shock increasing those frictions.
26Each panel of Figure 1 contains what are essentially two separate distributions. The ﬁrst, in
the foreground, has a distinctly curved shape that reﬂects an inverse relation between ﬁrms’ capital
stocks and their savings rates. This corresponds to older, wealthier ﬁrms that are unconstrained
and following the minimum savings policy described in section 4. Such ﬁrms have higher capital
and higher savings relative to constrained ﬁrms, which are distributed near the back of each
panel. As would be expected, the mean capital among constrained ﬁrms rises with ﬁrm-level
productivity, and the same is true for unconstrained ﬁrms.
The 10 percent of ﬁrms newly entering the economy each period are scattered across each 
level according to the ergodic productivity distribution. These ﬁrms enter with zero debt and
low initial capital (roughly 014), and are found in a large spike near the left edge of each panel
in Figure 1. After its ﬁrst date in production, each new ﬁrm begins to take on debt in eﬀort
to build up its capital. In the absence of the collateralized borrowing limits, young ﬁrms would
immediately take on a large, temporary debt that would allow them to jump to the capital stock
selected by unconstrained ﬁrms with the same current productivity level. Here, however, ﬁrms
with little collateral have a relatively limited ability to borrow, so their capital accumulation is
necessarily gradual. As a result, ripples of these entering ﬁrms slowly move into higher ranges
of  and  as they age. In the ﬁgure, the youngest ﬁrms are found along the back edge of
each panel; as they mature, they steadily raise their capital while maintaining a roughly constant
borrowing rate typically below the maximum permitted. Those ﬁrms that survive long enough
eventually reach a level of capital such that they can adopt the unconstrained capital choices
consistent with their current productivity while beginning to reduce their debt. Those surviving
longer still will, at some point, attain a level of capital and savings such that their investment
decisions become impervious to borrowing limits. At this point, they join the distribution of
unconstrained ﬁrms.
The life-cycle aspects of our model described above may be seen from Figure 2. There we
display the average capital and debt choices within a cohort of (initially) 25000 ﬁrms as they
age. Notice that the typical ﬁrm raises its capital and debt over its ﬁrst six periods of life.
Thereafter, starting in period 7, it begins to reduce its debt and ﬁnances the remaining rise in
its capital stock fully out of earnings. By age 16, the typical ﬁrm has become a net saver, and
thereafter joins the distribution of permanently unconstrained ﬁrms.
We next consider how the predicted relation between ﬁrm size and leverage ratios in our model
27compares with the data. Empirical evidence presented by Fama and French (2002) and Rajan
and Zingales (1995) indicates that leverage ratios rise with size. Reexamining the ﬁnding using
a panel of nonﬁnancial ﬁrms in the Compustat, Rampini and Viswanathan (2011) argue that the
positive relation between size (book value of assets) and leverage disappears when one accounts
f o ra no f t e no v e r l o o k e df o r mo fl e v e r a g eh e a v i l yu s e db ys m a l lﬁrms, the rental of capital.
Figure 2 does not imply that our model generates a strong negative relation between size and
leverage. Recall that this ﬁgure is not drawn from a balanced panel of ﬁrms. Given the constant
exit rate, there are fewer ﬁrms in the right half of the ﬁgure than there are on the left where
leverage is roughly constant. For this reason, when we draw a large random sample of ﬁrms
from our stationary distribution, we ﬁnd that the sample correlation between size and leverage
is −022, far less negative than Figure 2 would suggest. Note also that, because our model has
no theory of ﬁrm ownership, all leverage in our model is associated with investment loans. By
contrast, the data reﬂects not only borrowing for investment activities, but other activities such
as restructuring and mergers and acquisitions. Indeed, Ivashina and Scharfstein (2009) report
that two-thirds of syndicated loans in 2007 were associated with these other activities.
Extensions of our model allowing for diﬀerent borrowing constraints across ﬁrms could elim-
inate the small negative correlation between size and leverage, and even make it positive. For
example, consider a version of the model with two types of ﬁrms distinguished by diﬀerent levels
of 
,  = ,w i t h
  
.I f
 was suﬃciently large, ﬁrms of type  reaching the unconstrained
ﬁnancial status and hence adopting the minimum savings policy described in section 4 would hold
substantial debt. This would imply leverage ratios rising with size among type  ﬁrms. Since our
existing model has a correlation between size and leverage near 0, the fraction type  ﬁrms need
not be large to deliver an overall positive correlation in this example. Considering the response to
a credit shock yielding large reductions in each 
 in this setting, we expect that the real eﬀects
following a credit shock would be ampliﬁed relative to the results we present below, since large
ﬁrms would, in that case, have high levels of debt at the onset of the shock.
While relatively simple in its microeconomic elements, our existing model is consistent with
various aspects of ﬁrm-level behavior observed in the data. For example, our unconditional sta-
tionary ﬁrm size distribution is right-skewed, ﬁrm employment growth is negatively correlated
with age (Dunne, Roberts and Samuelson (1989)), and larger and older ﬁrms pay more dividends
28(Fama and French (2001)).22 Moreover, we remind the reader that the model is calibrated delib-
erately to reproduce the aspects of ﬁrm behavior most crucial in aﬀecting the core misallocation
mechanism therein. Speciﬁcally, our model matches the mean, variability and autocorrelation of
microeconomic investment rates.
Figure 3 is the no-ﬁnancial frictions counterpart to Figure 2, depicting the average capital
among the same cohort of ﬁrms in a version of our model where the collateral constraint is
removed, so that debt becomes irrelevant to investment. As in the previous ﬁgure, the cohort
enters the economy with low initial capital. However, in this case, young ﬁrms can immediately
reach their unconstrained capital targets for the start of the next period. Thus, we see a much
larger initial rise in capital between dates 1 and 2 relative to Figure 2. Notice, however, that
the elimination of ﬁnancial frictions does not entirely eliminate life-cycle aspects from our model.
Firms still face a real friction that causes bands of inaction in investment. Thus, as a ﬁrm transits
from one  to a lower one nearby, it will at times choose not to lower its capital stock, given the
forfeit of 5 percent of any capital uninstalled. Likewise, when a ﬁrm’s relative productivity rises,
it is slow to respond fully to that rise given the partial irreversibility in investment. As a result,
we see the average capital stock of the cohort gradually continuing to rise from age 2 to age
7. Nonetheless, this rise is quite modest relative to that between age 1 and 2; after taking into
account the implications of irreversibility, all but the newest ﬁrms operate at a scale appropriate
to their productivity. The quantitative impact of the more eﬃcient allocation of production this
implies is that steady state output rises by 4 percent relative to our full economy, with measured
TFP rising roughly 1 percent.
Returning to our full model economy with both frictions in place, Figure 4 illustrates the pure
eﬀects of the irreversibility in cases where it does not interact with the ﬁnancial friction in our
economy. It summarizes the capital choices made by unconstrained ﬁrms entering the period with
various levels of capital (measured on the x-axis) and debt (measured on the y-axis), conditional
on a current productivity draw. The top panel depicts ﬁrms entering with the lowest productivity
value, the middle panel shows those with the median value, and the bottom panel shows those the
highest productivity. The z-axis in each panel reports an indicator variable that takes on a value of
1 for unconstrained ﬁrms that invest positively to the upward target capital consistent with their
current productivity, a value of 2 for those investing negatively to the relevant downward target,
22Figures are available on request.
29and a value of 5 for those that remain inactive with respect to their capital, setting investment
to zero. (The right, rear areas with a zero indicator value are combinations of () where ﬁrms
are not unconstrained.)
The region of () where ﬁrms invest to their upward target capital expands into higher cur-
rent capital levels as one looks from the top panel downward, since rises in current productivity
predict higher marginal product of capital schedules next period. To the left of these regions
are the areas with zero investment induced by the irreversibility in capital. While the loss as-
sociated with uninstalling capital in our economy is only 5 percent, it nonetheless makes some
ﬁrms reluctant to shed capital. Those with higher current productivities are more so, given the
persistence in  alongside depreciation. As such, the inactivity region expands to higher capital
levels as productivity rises, while the region associated with downward investment shrinks, ﬁnally
disappearing from view by the bottom panel. On balance, of the 14 percent of ﬁrms in our
stationary distribution that are (permanently) unconstrained, 36 percent adjust to the upward
targets consistent with their productivities, 50 percent are inactive with respect to their capital,
while 14 percent undertake negative investment.
Figure 5 is analogous to Figure 4. Again conditional on currently productivity, it illustrates
the capital decisions taken by ﬁrms, this time considering those that are aﬀected by both the real
friction in our economy and the ﬁnancial one. Such ﬁrms represent 86 percent of the population in
our model’s steady state, and are located in regions of the () space to the right and back where
capital is low and/or debt is high. (Foreground areas where the indicator is zero are combinations
of () where ﬁrms are unconstrained.)
Because constrained ﬁrms’ capital choices are largely determined by life-cycle factors stemming
from the collateral constraints, they tend to avoid negative investment. Those investing positively
to the maximum capital permitted by their ability to borrow are reﬂected by a value of 3 on
the z-axis. These are ﬁrms with higher current productivity, comparatively low capital, and
comparatively high debt. They make up 32 percent of constrained ﬁrms in our model’s steady
state and are the only ﬁrms facing a currently binding borrowing limit. Looking just left and
i nf r o n to ft h a tr e g i o n ,ﬁrms with slightly higher capital (or slightly lower debt) adjust to their
upward capital targets. This region, reﬂected by a value of 1 on the z-axis, expands into higher
values of capital as  rises, since the target itself rises. In the stationary distribution, roughly
29 percent of constrained ﬁrms are of this type. Finally, looking further left in each panel, we have
30ﬁrms selecting inaction with respect to investment due to the irreversibility (with a z-axis value of
5), and thereafter those whose capital is suﬃciently high relative to their productivity that they
disinvest (with a z-value of 2). These categories represent 32 and 7 percent of constrained ﬁrms
in our model’s stationary distribution.
A comparison of Figure 5 to the preceding ﬁgure summarizing the capital decision rules of
permanently ﬁnancially unconstrained ﬁrms suggests that, for a large fraction of our economy’s
ﬁrms, ﬁnancial considerations interfere with the optimal ﬁrm-level investment responses to infor-
mation about the future marginal product of capital conveyed current productivity draws. Even
in ordinary times, this generates a misallocation of production across ﬁrms. One indication of
this is the fact that the average capital stock among unconstrained ﬁrms in our model’s stationary
distribution is 214, while the average stock of constrained ﬁrms is 119. As such, the typical old
ﬁrm in our economy has far more capital than the typical young ﬁr m ,d e s p i t et h ef a c tt h a te a c h
group draws from the same productivity distribution.
Old ﬁrms in our economy do not carry excess capital; the ineﬃciency lies in the fact that
young, small ﬁrms carry too little. This is clariﬁed by Figure 6, which again examines a cohort
of (initially) 25000 ﬁrms, this time focusing on the expected discounted return to investment
for a cohort as it ages over time. Absent real or ﬁnancial frictions, ﬁrms would always select
investment to equate this return to the unit purchase price of investment goods. In that case, the
mean investment return across ﬁr m si nt h et o pp a n e lo fo u rﬁgure would be constant at 1,a n d
the coeﬃcient of variation in this return in the bottom panel would always be 0. By contrast, in
our model, the mean expected discounted return to investment is 112 for a cohort as it ends its
ﬁrst year of production, and the coeﬃcient of variation in this return is 40. Thereafter, over each
subsequent year of life, we see ever less dispersion in the return to investment across surviving
members of the cohort, and the mean expected return falling towards 1
After a certain age, surviving members of the cohort have suﬃcient assets that ﬁnancial
frictions no longer aﬀect their investment decisions. Thus, we see the mean expected investment
return for the cohort ultimately reach a value around 1. Even then, there remains some variation
in the expected return, and its mean is not precisely 1,g i v e nt h e5 percent irreversibility of capital
in our economy. Recall the capital decision rules of unconstrained ﬁrms summarized in Figure 4.
316.2 Business Cycles
We begin to examine business cycle results by ﬁrst considering the eﬀect each friction in our
economy has on its typical business cycle. Table 1 presents some commonly reported business
cycle statistics derived from an HP-ﬁltered 5041 period simulation of our model economy under
the assumption that aggregate productivity shocks are the only source of aggregate ﬂuctuations,
Table 2 presents the corresponding moments when we eliminate ﬁnancial frictions, and Table 3
is the same economy with neither collateral constraints nor capital speciﬁcity. As expected, each
friction acts to reduce the average levels of output, capital, and consumption over our simulation.
Most notably, average output rises by roughly 41 percent when ﬁnancial frictions are stripped
away, then another 23 percent when the irreversibility is also eliminated.
Moving to consider second moments, there are some small diﬀerences across the three tables.
Output volatility rises between our full economy and the counterpart model without limits to bor-
rowing, and it rises again between that model and the one with no frictions. Despite this, as each
friction is lifted, the representative household grows more eﬀective in smoothing its consumption.
As the contemporaneous correlation between consumption and production is slightly weakened
from one table to the next, consumption’s standard deviation (raw and relative) falls. Elsewhere,
the volatility of hours worked rises steadily, and the hours series is marginally more correlated
with output as each friction is eliminated. The same monotone pattern does not follow for invest-
ment expenditures, however. There, the relative standard deviation falls from 383 percent to 377
percent as the ﬁnancial friction is stripped away, allowing the inertia associated with irreversibility
more prominence, while it rises to 404 percent when the irreversibility is eliminated.23
While we have mentioned some minor diﬀerences in the business cycle moments across Tables
1 through 3, two points are surely more important. The ﬁrst is that the business cycle moments
drawn from our full model in Table 1 are similar to those of a typical real business cycle model
without its complications. Output volatility is roughly 2 percent, consumption is about half
as volatile as output, and investment roughly four times as volatile as output. We also see the
customary strong positive contemporaneous correlations with output in consumption, investment,
and total hours worked. While the usual diﬃculties of excessive investment volatility and weak
hours volatility are a bit more pronounced here relative to some representative ﬁrm real business
23This evidence that ﬁrm-level capital irreversibilities dampen changes in aggregate investment is consistent with
earlier ﬁndings by Bertola and Caballero (1994).
32cycle models, these distinctions come from our diﬀering returns to scale in production rather than
either friction we mean to study; the same features are present in Table 3 with both removed.
This brings us to our second point. Despite the diﬀerences noted above, the second moments
across all three tables are quite similar on the whole. Comparing Table 1 to Table 2, in particular,
it appears that the typical business cycle in our economy is relatively impervious to some ordinary,
ongoing degree of ﬁnancial frictions. This observation is reinforced by Figure 7, which presents our
full model economy’s impulse responses following a persistent negative shock to the exogenous
component of total factor productivity. As may be seen from the close match between the
exogenous and measured TFP series in the top panel, a persistent real shock has inconsequential
implications for the endogenous component of aggregate productivity. Thus, examining output,
consumption, employment and investment, we see impulse responses closely resembling those of a
counterpart economy without real or ﬁnancial frictions, such as that summarized in Table 3. Just
as in a frictionless business cycle model, there are immediate declines in all four series. Further,
aside from the customary U-shaped consumption response, we see the largest declines at the
impact of the shock, with each series thereafter monotonically reverting toward its long-run level.
Note also that the largest percent drop in hours worked is half that of GDP, while investment’s
greatest drop is roughly 35 times that in GDP.
When driven solely by exogenous changes to total factor productivity, we have seen that our
model economy closely resembles a standard frictionless business cycle economy. This, in turn,
implies a failure to capture some key aspects of the latest U.S. recession, dated by the NBER as
2007Q4 - 2009Q2. Figure 8 reports the recent movements in GDP, consumption, investment,
employment hours and measured TFP, plotting each series’ percent deviations relative to their
2007Q4 levels.24 While the ﬁgure includes data over 2009Q3 - 2010Q4, we defer discussion of
the recovery period for now and focus here on the economic downturn within the NBER recession
dates.
Figure 8 reveals that the initial response in GDP was negligible, while real personal consump-
tion expenditure actually rose by roughly 1 percent and stayed high until 2008Q4. Moreover, the
immediate declines in investment were modest relative to what came later. While total private
24Our hours series extends through 2010Q4 the Cociuba et. al (2009) series representing total civilian and military
hours worked per noninstitutional population aged 16 to 64. The results presented here change in no notable way
if we omit the military component from this series. Our measured TFP series is a direct Solow Residual calculation
based on the productive shares of labor and capital to which our model is calibrated.
33investment fell immediately, this was initially driven by housing. Non-residential investment did
not begin to fall until 2008Q3, at which point it began to drop oﬀ sharply relative to the more
gradual declines in GDP and consumption. Measured TFP falls until the ﬁrst quarter of 2009,
w h e r ei ti s16 percent below its initial level. Elsewhere, the greatest declines in all other series
in this ﬁgure do not occur until 2009Q2 or later. As of 2009Q2, GDP was roughly 4 percent
below its initial level, total hours had declined 17 times as much as GDP, while the investment
drop was ﬁve to six times that in GDP.25
On balance, the recent U.S. economic downturn presents several challenges for any equilibrium
business cycle model driven by shocks to technology. First, it shows an initial rise in consumption
where the model would predict a clear decline. Next, the ultimate losses in employment and
investment by the end of the recession are far greater than in the model. The magnitudes of
change in these series relative to output are also several times larger than predicted.
6.3 A Credit Crisis
Clearly, the challenges regarding the latest U.S. recession apply not only to a standard busi-
ness cycle model but also to our model, so long as its aggregate ﬂuctuations arise solely from
changes in exogenous productivity. However, our focus is on understanding what happens when
the extent of ﬁnancial frictions suddenly and unexpectedly grows more severe than is normal.
Given its assumption of a representative ﬁrm, the standard business cycle model is unaﬀected by
such events. We now explore their eﬀect in our model where ﬁrms have diﬀerent access to, and
need for, credit.
Before continuing, we discuss the evidence for an exogenous shock to the availability of credit
that, in our model, corresponds to an unanticipated decline in . As is now well understood, it is
hard to ﬁnd conclusive evidence that the U.S. has experienced an exogenous reduction in lending
to businesses. In an early exploration of this issue, Chari et al. (2008) argued there was little
evidence that the ﬁnancial crisis had aﬀected lending to nonﬁnancial ﬁrms. Examining the Flow
of Funds, they found that the stock of commercial and industrial loans across regulated banks
had actually risen as of the third quarter of 2008.
Chari et al. (2008) also argue that, in the aggregate, business ﬁxed investment is less than
25Ohanian (2010) presents evidence that the magnitudes of these declines in investment and hours relative to
GDP are dramatic in comparison with those seen in pevious postwar U.S. recessions, as well as other G7 countries’
2007-9 recesssions.
34ﬁrms’ revenues net of labor costs; that is, the mean ﬁrm can self-ﬁnance investment. It is
worth noting that our calibrated model is consistent with this observation in the aggregate data.
Nonetheless, borrowing limits bind for some smaller ﬁrms, and this leads to insuﬃcient capital in
those ﬁrms, reducing both aggregate TFP and GDP.
Ivashina and Scharfstein (2010) re-examine the issue of lending over the ﬁnancial crisis. They
study Reuters DealScan data on syndicated loans, which captures new lending to large corpo-
rations. While these loans originate with banks, the pool of lenders, which includes non-bank
ﬁnancial institutions, is larger. Moreover, the data on syndicated lending covers new loans, as
opposed to the stock of outstanding debt that is reported in the Flow of Funds. Ivashina and
Scharfstein ﬁnd strong evidence of a reduction in lending. Between 2007 and 2008, total syndi-
cated lending fell 54 percent, while loans used to fund investment in equipment and structures
fell 48 percent.
Koepke and Thomson (2011) examine loans from FDIC-insured commercial banks and savings
institutions. They ﬁnd that total lending declined between 2008 and 2009 and since then has not
recovered to its pre-recession level. Importantly, commercial and industrial loans, which are an
important source of borrowing for small and medium-sized businesses, fell 18.7 percent between
2008Q4 and 2009Q4. These loans continued to fall through 2010Q2, when they were 19.1 percent
below their level at the start of the recession, in 2007Q4.
While these papers provide evidence that there has been a reduction in lending to nonﬁnancial
ﬁrms, they do not establish whether this represents an exogenous reduction in credit or instead
an equilibrium response to reductions in business ﬁxed investment. However, both Almeida et
al. (2009) and Duchin et al. (2010) provide support for a credit shock interpretation. Controlling
for ﬁrm characteristics using a matching estimator, Almeida et al. study the investment behavior
of ﬁrms that, given their existing loan maturity structures, needed to reﬁnance a substantial
fraction of their long-term debt over the year following August 2007, the onset of the ﬁnancial
crisis. They ﬁnd that investment spending among such ﬁrms fell by one-third. By contrast,
other ﬁrms with similar characteristics, but without a large reﬁnancing in the period following
the start of the ﬁnancial crisis, showed no investment reduction. Since the fraction of long-term
debt maturing after August 2007 is likely exogenous to the ﬁnancial crisis, this suggests that there
was an exogenous reduction in the supply of credit. Duchin et al. (2010) compare the behavior
of ﬁr m st h a tw e r ec a r r y i n gm o r ec a s hp r i o rt ot h eo n s e to ft h ec r i s i sw i t ht h a to fﬁrms carrying
35less cash. Using a diﬀerence-in-diﬀerence approach, they ﬁnd that ﬁr m sw i t hl e s sl i q u i da s s e t s
before the ﬁnancial crisis exhibited a larger reduction in investment.
Given this evidence that the recent recession involved an exogenous reduction in lending, we
now examine a credit shock in our model economy. Figure 9 depicts our economy’s response
to a ﬁnancial crisis, absent any technology shock. More speciﬁcally, it is the response to a 55
percentage point drop in the value of ﬁrms’ collateral, as generated by a reduction in ,w h i c hw e
will see below implies an eventual 23 percent reduction in debt. This reduction is not implausibly
large relative to the actual declines in various measures of lending since the onset of the 2007
credit crisis, as discussed above. While it is slightly larger than the reduction in the commercial
and industrial loans of regulated banks, it is substantially smaller than the fall in syndicated loans
used to ﬁnance investment.
>From the ﬁrst date of the credit shock onwards, we assume that households and ﬁrms expect
an eventual return to normal ﬁnancial conditions. Each period, they place 40 percent probability
on a full ﬁnancial recovery in the subsequent period. Thus, when the shock occurs in period
1,t h e ye x p e c ti tw i l lp e r s i s tf o r25 years.26 However, we begin by focusing on the downturn
following a credit shock. Thus we omit the actual recovery from this ﬁgure.
Although the distribution of capital is predetermined when the ﬁnancial shock hits in year 1,
the top left panel of Figure 9 reveals that aggregate production immediately falls by about 15
percent (relative to its simulated mean in normal ﬁnancial times). This is, of course, a direct
consequence of the 24 percent fall in the labor input (top right panel), which is, in turn, a
reaction to the reduced expected return to investment (bottom right panel). With the sudden
reduction in credit, there is a drop in the fraction of ﬁrms that are ﬁnancially unconstrained and
a sharp rise in the fraction of ﬁrms facing currently binding borrowing limits. Underlying these
changes, young ﬁrms are now far more hindered in their investment activities relative to the pre-
shock economy, and thus will take considerably longer to outgrow ﬁnancial frictions and begin
producing at a scale consistent with their productivities. If these ﬁnancial conditions persisted, the
resulting stationary distribution would have 51 percent of ﬁrms constrained in their current upward
capital adjustments and 1 percent of ﬁrms forced to undertake some negative investment to repay
outstanding debt. In ordinary ﬁnancial times, these percentages are 27 and 0, respectively. In the
meantime, ﬁrms that are unconstrained after the ﬁnancial shock must increase their precautionary
26This represents an average of 2 and 3 years it took GDP and consumption to recover, respectively, took to their
2007Q4 level.
36savings to remain so. As a result, aggregate savings among ﬁrms that are not borrowers rises
roughly 30 percent at the date of the shock; thereafter, while the stock of debt declines, this series
slowly falls toward its initial level, reaching about 10 percent above normal by date 4 (Figure
available on request.)
Unlike the response that would follow a negative productivity shock, consumption does not
immediately fall when the ﬁnancial shock hits our economy. Anticipating a more distorted distri-
bution of production over coming years, and thus unusually low endogenous total factor produc-
tivity (in the lower right panel), the representative household in our economy expects a lowered
return to saving. This leads to a 05 percent rise in consumption at the impact of the shock, and
also a rise in leisure. This eﬀect of reduced future TFP is compounded by the fact that the initial
aggregate capital stock is roughly 9 percent above that consistent with the tighter borrowing
conditions, which further encourages consumption and leisure.27 The fall in investment (at lower
left) does not support consumption for long, however; consumption falls to its pre-shock level
by year 3, then steadily declines for roughly 8 more years before it levels oﬀ. Elsewhere, labor
falls at the impact of the shock as described above. Thereafter, given the severe misallocation of
capital at the start of date 2, alongside reductions in the total capital stock, the marginal product
of labor drops, yielding further large reductions in employment. By year 3,e m p l o y m e n ti s39
percent below its pre-shock level, and it does not rise back to the level consistent with the new
ﬁnancial setting until around period 15. This long adjustment period is a reﬂection of the time
that it takes for the capital distribution to settle, as may be inferred from the measured TFP
response in the lower right panel.
Figure 10 illustrates how the unanticipated tightening of credit distorts the allocation of pro-
duction in our economy, giving rise to the initial aggregate changes in the previous ﬁgure. The
top panel plots the distribution of ﬁrms over capital and productivity that is in place in date
1 when the shock occurs. The lower panel shows the same distribution at the start of date
2, once the tightened borrowing conditions have begun aﬀecting ﬁrm-level investment activities.
Comparing these two panels, we see a noticeable rise in dispersion within just one period of the
shock. The mass of ﬁrms with capital stocks between 1.5 and 3 in the top panel is considerably
27Fernald and Matoba (2009) argue that utilization-adjusted total factor productivity rose over the recent U.S.
recession. The counterpart to their series in our model, the exogenous component of TFP, is held constant over our
credit shock exercise. A positive shock to this series could be introduced, provided the credit shock was adjusted
so that measured TFP still fell as in the data.
37reduced, with much of that mass pushed into lower regions of capital by date 2. In other words,
the shock creates fewer medium-sized ﬁrms and more small ﬁr m s . A tt h es a m et i m e ,w es e ea
few ﬁrms, the very largest, growing larger.28
Given a heightened misallocation of production coming in date 2, the largest ﬁrms that are
otherwise unaﬀected by credit concerns respond to the reduced real interest rate by expanding in
size. Such ﬁrms adopt the eﬃcient capital levels dictated by their (S,s) investment policies, given
the productivities and real interest rate they face. The increased ineﬃciency that reduces TFP
arises because small ﬁrms, now facing more severe collateral requirements, see the gap between
their expected discounted return to capital and the real rate widen.
Figure 11 shows that these problems do not abate in nearby dates, in that dispersion continues
to rise. The top panel shows that the mean of the (ex-post) marginal product of capital moves
further above its pre-crisis value (0134) during the ﬁrst 8 periods over which the overall stock
of capital is being reduced. The lower panel plots the coeﬃcient of variation in ﬁrms’ marginal
products. This measure of dispersion rises over the ﬁrst several dates of the ﬁnancial crisis, and
then begins to return toward its pre-crisis level (0537). That initial level is never fully recovered
in this ﬁgure, however, because ﬁnancial conditions do not improve.
Critically, the increase in the mean marginal product of capital coincides with a fall in the
ex-post real interest rate. The marginal product of capital across large, unconstrained ﬁrms falls,
with the contrasting rise in the economywide average driven entirely by tighter borrowing limits
for other ﬁrms. Capital falls in these ﬁrms over time, so their marginal product of capital rises.
With the increased dispersion in the returns to capital, the coeﬃcient of variation is seen to rise.
These results in our model following a credit shock are reminiscent of empirical results in Eisfeldt
and Rampini (2006), who show that the beneﬁts of capital reallocation rise in recessions while
the level of reallocation falls. In our model, both forces operate.
On balance, we take the following observations from Figures 9 - 11. A tightening of collateral
constraints alone, a purely ﬁnancial shock, drives large and persistent real eﬀects in our model
economy. It does so because it increases the dispersion in ﬁrm-level capital further away from
28Using BEDS data from the Bureau of Labor Statistics, Gilchrist (2011) compares average employment growth
for ﬁrms with more than 500 employees to average employment growth rate of ﬁrms with less than 500 employees
and ﬁnds that, after 2007, small ﬁrms reduced employment more rapidly than large ﬁrms. More generally, our
increased dispersion in production is consistent with evidence from Bloom et al (2009) that various measures of
ﬁrm-level dispersion rise during recessions.
38the eﬃcient level consistent with productivity dispersion (and capital speciﬁcity) and it allocates
insuﬃcient capital to an expanded group of small ﬁrms, putting downward pressure on the interest
rate. In the example we have shown here, the misallocation of production arising from tight
ﬁnancial conditions is compounded by the reductions in aggregate capital, productivity, and
labor that it causes. As a result, there are protracted adjustments in aggregate quantities lasting
a decade or more, and GDP is ultimately reduced by 36 percent, while aggregate consumption
is reduced by 13 percent.
We next consider what implications the prolonged ﬁnancial crisis from above can have if its
onset is followed by a 1 standard deviation negative technology shock. As seen in the lower right
panel of Figure 12, the exogenous component of TFP falls one year after the ﬁnancial shock hits,
and thereafter gradually reverts to its mean. Were credit markets functioning as normal when this
TFP shock appeared, output would fall 38 percent, labor would fall 2 percent, and the half-life
of the output response would be roughly 5 years, as seen in Figure 7. While the overall declines
in quantities here are larger and protracted, they are no more so than would be expected once we
account for the eﬀects of the credit shock in Figure 8.
Until now, we have considered the implications of a persistent ﬁnancial crisis, in that borrowing
conditions do not recover throughout the exercises depicted in Figures 9 - 12. We next consider
the recovery. We assume the same ﬁnancial shock studied in Figure 9 persists for 4 periods;
thereafter, beginning in date 5, we allow a complete recovery of ﬁnancial conditions, returning
the value of collateral to normal. Over the ﬁrst four periods, agents have the same expectations
regarding ﬁnancial recovery as we assumed above. Thereafter, beginning in date 5, they under-
stand that borrowing conditions have permanently recovered. We omit the negative TFP shock
from this exercise for expositional simplicity, as we have seen above that its implications do not
add unexpected or noteworthy features to the impulse responses.
In Table 4, we compare the peak-to-trough behavior of our model with the 2007 US recession.
Driven solely by a credit shock, our model generates the same decline in GDP as in the data.
Furthermore, the 23 percent fall in investment is almost as large as the 27 percent in the data.
Elsewhere, the model explains roughly half of the actual reduction in employment and 43 percent
of the fall in consumption. As shown below, the overall fall in consumption in our model is larger,
but it occurs after the trough in GDP.
Consider these results in comparison with the responses to a technology shock, whether in
39our model or in a standard representative ﬁrm model. On its own, a technology shock cannot
reconcile the empirical declines in GDP, measured TFP and investment. A one-standard deviation
exogenous shock to TFP generates almost as large a change in GDP, −385 percent, and about half
the fall in employment. However the required change in TFP, −267 percent, is far larger than the
largest change measured in the data, which was −165 percent in 2009Q1.29 Furthermore, the drop
in investment is only 14 percent. In contrast, following a credit shock, our model reproduces the
changes in output and investment observed in the data, without implying a counterfactually large
decline in measured TFP. Furthermore, this exercise implies a reduction in debt of 228 percent,
which is comparable to the 19 percent fall in commercial and industrial loans by regulated banks
through the end of 2009, and far less than the 48 drop in syndicated lending between 2007 and
2008. In contrast, the TFP-shock driven recession generates less than a 4 percent fall in debt.
Figure 13 shows the full credit shock driven recession in our model, including the recovery.
Three aspects of the responses there are worthy of note. First, so long as GDP or consumption
is adopted as our measure, the eﬀects of a large credit shock are not rapidly reversed. Although
loan markets are operating normally in year 5, GDP remains 31 percent below trend in that date.
Moreover, GDP recovers twice as slowly as in the data, with a half-life of 1.5 years. Consumption
takes longer to return to its average with a half life of 4 periods. The slow recovery of output and
consumption after real and ﬁnancial frictions have been restored to their ordinary levels arises in
part from the fact that the distribution of capital does not immediately settle back to its pre-shock
state. As a result, aggregate productivity remains below normal until year 8, as seen in the third
panel of the ﬁgure. This compounds the fact that the aggregate capital stock is more that 5
percent below its usual level by the start of the recovery.
Second, consumption does not begin to recover in date 5. Given a high demand for investment
goods, and output’s failure to rebound rapidly, households actually allow their consumption to
fall for two more periods and thereafter raise it only very slowly. Third, during this episode,
it is the labor input that drives the recovery. Anticipating the subsequent rise in endogenous
productivity, and thus a raised return to savings, households abruptly raise their hours worked
from 36 percent to only 11 percent below normal within date 5. In the next date, the allocation
of capital across ﬁrms has begun to move back toward the long-run distribution, and the resulting
improvement in productivity directly encourages a further large rise in the labor input. At this
29Because TFP led GDP in the 2007 recession, the change reported in Table 4 reﬂecting the 2007Q4 to 2009Q2
drop in TFP was less, at 060 percent.
40point, it overshoots its average level by just over 1 percent. Thereafter, it remains high for many
periods while the capital stock is being rebuilt.
One and a half years after the start of the recovery in 2009Q2, there is little net change in
total hours worked in the data. In the model, the recovery is stronger. In part because it fell
by less, employment regains two-thirds of its pre-crisis level within a year. In 2010Q4, private
investment is still more than 20 percent below its pre-recessionary level. Here again, the model
predicts a more rapid recovery, with investment less than ten percent below its steady state level
after one year. Nonetheless, these responses are more gradual than would be seen following an
equivalent shock to TFP.30
The rapid growth in investment and employment, relative to the data, is in part a result our
assumption that lending conditions, as represented by the value of , are completely restored
in one period. We have not examined gradual changes in  in the exercises presented above
largely because data restricting  period-by-period is unavailable. Moreover, our assumption of a
constant probability of complete reversal in  has allowed us to solve for impulse responses under
uncertainty. We have explored the economy’s response following a gradual recovery in  under
the assumption of perfect foresight.31 The recovery in investment and employment is somewhat
slower there, but that in output and consumption is also slowed.
7C o n c l u d i n g r e m a r k s
We have developed a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model with persistent, ﬁrm-level
shocks to total factor productivity, costly investment reversibility and collateralized borrowing
constraints. We have calibrated the model to be consistent with U.S. evidence on establishment-
level investment dynamics, as well as overall measures of borrowing by non-ﬁnancial ﬁrms. Our
resulting economy is characterized by a nontrivial distribution of ﬁrms over productivity, debt
and capital that shapes aggregate output and total factor productivity.
30Consider an exogenous one standard deviation reduction in aggregate total factor productivity. Absent any
credit shock, this TFP shock would result in a similar fall in GDP to that seen in ﬁgure 10. If this shock was
eliminated at date 5, with the exogenous component of TFP immediately reset to its long-run level, then GDP
would complete 94 percent of its recovery instantaneously. By contrast, the corresponding instantaneous rise in
GDP in ﬁgure 10, following the elimination of the credit shock, is only 27 percent. Furthermore, the rapid increases
in employment and investment seen in ﬁgure 10 would be instantaneous with the elimination of a technology shock.
31The results of these exercises are available upon request.
41Firms respond endogenously to the frictions they face and, over time, build suﬃcient precau-
tionary savings so as to ensure that borrowing limits will not aﬀect their investment. Only a small
subset of the ﬁrms in our economy have investment activities curtailed by their current ability
to borrow. Nonetheless, borrowing and investment decisions are inter-related for most ﬁrms, and
the risk associated with future collateral constraints aﬀects their current decisions with respect
to both.
Our model predicts that, in a modern developed economy such as the U.S., the typical business
cycle may be relatively unaﬀected by ﬁnancial frictions. Nonetheless, absent any real shock to the
economy, we ﬁnd that a credit crisis on its own can generate a recession that is not only large, but
persistent. Because tight borrowing conditions deliver a long-lived disruption to the distribution
of capital, and thus to endogenous aggregate productivity, their aftermath is a gradual recovery
in output.
The recession generated in our model by a credit shock is qualitatively diﬀerent from that
following a negative shock to aggregate productivity, and it more closely resembles the 2007 U.S.
recession in several respects. The decline in GDP is gradual. Consumption initially rises. The
response in investment is unusually severe relative to the fall in GDP. The decline in measured
TFP that accompanies these movements in output, consumption and investment is similar to that
in the data.
While capturing several aspects of the recent U.S. recession, the credit shock we have consid-
ered here does not deliver the unusually slow recovery in investment and employment over the 18
months of data since the trough of the recession in 2009Q2. It is possible that tight credit has
aﬀected not only business ﬁxed investment, but also ﬁrms’ ability to ﬁnance working capital used
to pay wages, and that lending conditions did not fully recover by the end of 2010 (Koepke and
Thomson (2011)). However, no such explanation is likely to reconcile the observed changes in
investment and employment with the growth in consumption and GDP. A more likely suggestion
proposed by Ohanian (2010) is that time-varying distortions in the labor market have been im-
portant in shaping employment over this recession. Given the complexity of our current model,
micro-founding such additional frictions is beyond the scope of this paper.
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exogenous TFPTABLE 1. Business Cycles in the Full Economy
x = Y C I N K r
mean(x) 0:581 0:487 0:094 0:333 1:321 0:042
￿x=￿Y (1:919) 0:514 3:834 0:547 0:477 0:476
corr(x;Y ) 1:000 0:939 0:968 0:946 0:066 0:665
TABLE 2. Business Cycles Without Financial Frictions
x = Y C I N K r
mean(x) 0:605 0:502 0:103 0:336 1:438 0:042
￿x=￿Y (1:955) 0:497 3:768 0:568 0:471 0:454
corr(x;Y ) 1:000 0:930 0:969 0:948 0:062 0:675
TABLE 3. Business Cycles Without Financial or Real Frictions
x = Y C I N K r
mean(x) 0:619 0:518 0:101 0:333 1:555 0:042
￿x=￿Y (1:972) 0:479 4:037 0:588 0:451 0:440
corr(x;Y ) 1:000 0:918 0:968 0:950 0:047 0:682TABLE 4. Peak-to-Trough Changes: U.S. 2007 Recession and Model
x = GDP I N C TFP
Data ￿4:14 ￿25:75 ￿6:89 ￿1:36 ￿0:60
Model (￿g. 9) ￿4:20 ￿22:98 ￿3:62 ￿0:58 ￿0:97
TABLE 5. Conditional Forecasting Rules
z realization ￿0 ￿1 S:E: adj. R2
forecasting m0 z1 (915 obs.) 0:03577 0:79631 0:00040 0:99982
z2 (3142 obs.) 0:05680 0:79552 0:00038 0:99975
z3 (984 obs.) 0:07924 0:79320 0:00023 0:99994
forecasting p z1 (915 obs.) 0:86951 ￿0:40721 0:00006 0:99998
z2 (3142 obs.) 0:83032 ￿0:39881 0:00009 0:99995
z3 (984 obs.) 0:79137 ￿0:39253 0:00003 0:99999